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ARGUMENT
In defending its denial of Mr. Black's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment (the "Motion"), Respondent, the Utah State Insurance Department (the
"Department") argues that the Motion was inadequate under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) of the
Utah R. Civ. P.1 As set forth below, the Department's position is incorrect.
I.

MR. BLACK'S MOTION WAS PROPER AND SET FORTH ADEQUATE
BASES UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Under Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., "the courts are generally indulgent toward the

setting aside of default judgments where [1] there is a reasonable justification or excuse
for the defendant's failure to appear, and [2] where timely application is made to set it
aside."2 Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Development Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah
1980). Further, courts must balance the plaintiffs interest in its default judgment against
"the court['s] desires to protect the losing party who has not had the opportunity to
present his claim or defense." Airkem Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431
(Utah 1973).
A.
Mr. Black's Illness and Lack of Knowledge of the Complaint Are
Reasonable Justifications Under Rule 60(b)(1).
Mr. Black filed the Motion to set aside the Department's Default Judgment
because at the time the Department filed the Complaint, Mr. Black was completely
unaware of the Complaint or the Department's claims, and he was incapable of even

l

This brief will employ the same abbreviations as those used in Mr. Black's principal brief.

2

The Department does not dispute that the Motion was timely.
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inquiring about the Complaint, let alone taking the affirmative action necessary to retain
counsel to respond. Such action was, at the time, completely beyond Mr. Black's
capacity because of his illness. His illness and lack of awareness were reasonable
justifications under Rule 60(b)(1) justifying relief from the Default Judgment.
The Depaitment, however, argues that because it followed the statutory procedure
for service of process in an agency action, it was justified, acting as the administrative
agency, to enter the Default Judgment. In fact, the Depaitment argues at length how it
strictly complied with the statutory instructions for service of process—and even exceeded
the basic requirements. Mr. Black does not dispute that the Depaitment followed the
prescribed statutory procedures. The fact remains that despite the Depaitment's alleged
compliance with the statute, Mr. Black never saw the Complaint or knew of the
Department's claims until after Default Judgment was entered. Thus, even if the
procedure was coixect, Mr. Black was never on notice. The Depaitment relies on its stiict
interpretation of the statutory formula, when, in reality, this case demands the flexibility
and compassion of equity to allow Mr. Black— a disabled man— the opportunity to
present his defenses to the Department's claims. All he seeks by this Motion is his day in
court.
The Depaitment further argues that pursuant to statute, Mr. Black should have
notified the Depaitment of his "change of address" and, as such, was at fault for not
receiving the Complaint. The Depaitment as trial court misperceives the evidence on this
issue. Mr. Black did not change his domicile; he was temporarily away from home. As
stated in his affidavit, he was simply living in Cache Valley at the time, convalescing
-2-

from his illness. (R. at 35-36.) This was similar to an extended hospital stay, rather than
an "address change." If, for example, an insurance licensee requires extended
hospitalization, there is no statutory requirement that he notify the Department. If the
Department mailed a Complaint to that licensee's home while he was in the hospital, the
Department could, conceivably, obtain default judgment against him while hospitalized.
In that situation, the licensee's failure to receive the complaint would undoubtedly
constitute excusable neglect, even if the Department rigidly adhered to—and even
exceeded—the statutory requirements for service of process. Mr. Black's situation is
similar and he should not be held at fault for his lack of knowledge of the Complaint.3
The Department also argues that Mr. Black's illness did not justify his failure to
answer. This position not only ignores the gravity of Mr. Black's illness, it also is not
supported by case law. The record clearly reflects that Mr. Black was under the constant
care of a physician, and his illness was so debilitating he could not work. (R. at 35). The
operation of Black's Title was taken over by Kathi Black. kL Because of his condition,
he did not retrieve his mail at Black's Title nor could he even enforce a request for his
mail. The Department's argument implies that Mr. Black had the ability to exercise some
control over the affairs of the company. In fact, the record reflects that his condition
made it impossible for him to even fully inform himself of company issues, much less
exert any control over those issues.

3

Likewise, because Mr. Black's neglect was excusable and because he bore no fault for
not responding to the Complaint, he cannot be shouldered with any responsibility Mr. Diumenti
may have had in failing to respond, as the Department suggests.
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It neither "strains credulity" nor the imagination to conceive of such an
aixangement, as the Department suggests. See Respondent's Brief at 28. Neither does it
"strain credulity" to believe that Mr. Black visited his office in the last half of 1997
without receiving any notice of the Complaint. Mr. Black stated in his affidavit that he
visited his office only on a few occasions. The Department has presented no evidence
that he ever actually received the Complaint nor that he was in Black's Title during the
limited thirty-day period after the Department mailed the Complaint.
The Department further suggests that Mr. Black's failure to respond was somehow
"willful" and that Mr. Black had a duty to inform himself of the Department's
investigation. See Respondent's Brief at 33. There is nothing in the record to clearly
suggest that the Department's investigation was even ongoing at the time Mr. Black met
with Mr. Diumenti regarding the sale of Black's Title. Nor does the record suggest that
the Complaint was filed or that Mr. Diumenti was aware of it during such a meeting.
Thus, in light of Mr. Black's debilitating illness, his lack of awareness hardly rises to the
level of negligence, much less willfulness.
The Department cites Warren v. Dixon Ranch. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953), in
support of their argument that illness does not rise to the level of excusable neglect.
Warren, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Warren, a default judgment
was entered against a party who was ill yet had knowledge of the proceeding against
them. Despite knowledge of the proceeding, the defaulting party did nothing. The
defaulting party also never alleged that their illness was a circumstance which prevented
them from defending themselves.
-4-

In the case at bar, however, Mr. Black's illness not only prevented his response,
but it was a major factor as to why he had no knowledge of the Department's Complaint.
Thus, Mr. Black's illness, together with the fact that he never received—or even saw—the
Department's Complaint, create a legitimate, justifiable explanation and excuse for not
responding.4 Accordingly, the Department erred in denying Mr. Black's Motion, and this
Court should reverse that determination and set aside the Default Judgment.
B.

Setting Aside Default and Default Judgment Will Not Cause Serious
Injustice to the Department.

In Rule 60(b) motions to set aside default judgments, courts agree that "trial courts
should be generally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes
so they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and justice . . .," and "the
discretion should always be so exercised as to promote the ends of justice." Heath v.
Mower. 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979). Significantly, "[t]he uniform acknowledged
policy of the law is to accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where
that can be done without serious injustice to the other party." Interstate Excavating. Inc.
v. Agla Development Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980).
Reversing the Department's denial of the Motion will accord Mr. Black the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits without serious injustice to the Department. The

4

The Department cites Anderson v. Public Service Commission. 839 P.2d 822
(Utah 1992), to support the proposition that Mr. Black had a duty to look for mail sent from the
Department. In Anderson, the defendant, a licensed limousine driver, suspiciously failed to claim
his mail when he knew that the Public Service Commission would be sending an order in the mail
revoking his license. Anderson is distinguishable from the present case because Mr. Black did not
know about the Department's investigation.
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Department does have a responsibility to uphold the statutory standards governing
insurance licensing, but that interest is not impaired by hearing this case on its merits. In
fact, hearing a license revocation complaint on its merits presents the Department with
the opportunity to fulfill their statutory duties more fully by ensuring fairness and good
faith in their actions in order to preserve the integrity of the Department and protect the
licensee's admittedly "large investment of time and money." See Respondent's Brief at
49.
Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Development Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah
1980), is similar to the present case. In Interstate Excavating, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's denial of a motion to set aside default judgment against a
defendant who claimed not to have received notice of a trial date because his attorney
withdrew, and any notices to the defendant may have been misplaced in the defendant's
offices with numerous other papers. The Court granted the motion because the interests
of justice were better served by allowing the defendant the opportunity to be heard. The
Court found no serious injustice to the plaintiff in allowing the defendant an opportunity
to have his case heard on the merits where the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
default only seventeen days after discovering the default and within the three-month
statutory period. Further, the Court reasoned that reversal was appropriate because the
defendant had a reasonable justification for his failure to appear where his attorney quit
only three weeks prior to the trial in which default was entered, the defendant had no
actual knowledge of the proceeding, and the defendant diligently proceeded to prosecute
their case on the merits once he did have knowledge of the default. See id
-6-

In the present case, the Department denied Mr. Black's Motion despite Mr.
Black's debilitating illness and complete lack of actual knowledge of the Complaint. This
Court should reverse the Department's decision because the interests of justice will be
better served by allowing Mr. Black the opportunity to be heard. No serious injustice
will burden the Department where Mr. Black filed this Motion only sixteen days after
seeing the Complaint for the first time and within the three-month statutory period.
Further, reversal is appropriate because Mr. Black has a reasonable justification for his
failure to appear, and Mr. Black diligently proceeded to petition the Department to set
aside the Default Judgment once he became aware of it.
The present case is also similar to Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949),
in which the defendant, an alien resident in the United States, brought a motion to set
aside a default judgment rendered against him that revoked his Certificate of
Naturalization. The Court held that the United States would suffer no injustice "where all
[the defendant] asks is a chance to try the denaturalization proceeding on its merits." LI
at 607. In fact, the Court found it unjust that the defendant's citizenship should be
revoked without the government providing any proof whatsoever of wrongdoing,
especially where even such minor judgments as money claims, short prison terms, and
divorce decrees must be supported by at least some actual proof before default can be
entered.
Klapprott was deprived of a substantial legal right — his citizenship. Similarly, the
Department's Default Judgment deprived Mr. Black of his insurance license and
livelihood. The Department would suffer no injustice where all Mr. Black requests is a
-7-

chance to try the license revocation action on its merits. Further, this Court should find it
unjust in Mr. Black's situation that his license and livelihood should be revoked without
the Department providing any proof whatsoever of wrongdoing.
In light of the foregoing argument, this Court should reverse the Department's
denial of Mr. Black's Motion and permit this case to be heard on its merits.

II.

MR. BLACK'S MOTION IS ALSO APPROPRIATE UNDER RULE 60(b)(6)
BECAUSE "OTHER REASONS" JUSTIFY RELIEF
Rule 60(b)(6) is a great reservoir of equitable power, granting courts broad

authority to relieve a party form judgment "upon terms that are just." Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.. 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988). In the present
case, the record contains numerous "other" reasons justifying the use of this equitable
power to set aside the Default Judgment. The Department, acting as the trial court,
refused to consider those reasons and now continues to argue, incorrectly, that Mr. Black
is barred from presenting those reasons as bases for setting aside the Default Judgment.
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that "other reasons" may justify granting relief if "[fjirst,
the reason must be one other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through [5]; second,
the reason must justify relief; and third, that the motion must be made within a reasonable
time." See Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982).
Potential prejudice to the non-moving party is also a consideration. See id at 1307.
While subdivision (6) may not be used to circumvent the time strictures of subdivision
(1), there is nothing to prevent facts and events which fail to fully give rise to relief under
-8-

subdivisions (1) through (5) from creating other reasons under subdivision (6), as long as
the claim is brought within the three-month period. See id at 1308 (Utah Supreme Court
would have applied facts to both subdivision (1) and (6) had the motion not been tardily
filed six months after judgment was entered).
The Department argues that no facts which fit under subdivisions (1) through (5)
may be considered under subdivision (6). This argument is over broad. While courts
generally state that facts raised under subdivision (6) should not include ones that could
be raised under subdivisions (1) through (5), those courts have also carefully narrowed
that generality by clarifying that subdivision (6) cannot be used to circumvent the threemonth time limit put on subdivisions (1) through (3). See, e.g.. Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.. 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988); Laub, 657 P.2d at
1307-08; Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In fact, in each of those
cases, the defendants moved to set aside default long after the three-month period had
passed and were somehow trying to circumvent that time limitation. See, e.g.. Liljeberg.
486 U.S. at 863 n. 11 (defendant brought Rule 60(b)(6) motion 10 months after learning
judge had interest in case). Thus, subdivision (6) is available when facts which typically
fall under subdivision (1) may not rise to the level excusable neglect, but are still factors
which may lead a court to set aside judgment on equitable grounds.
In the event the factors set forth in the preceding section do not rise to the level of
"excusable neglect" justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(1), then the fact of Mr. Black's
illness and all other circumstances set forth in the record, taken together, justify setting
-9-

aside Default and Default Judgment against him. The chief among those reasons remains
that Mr. Black, because of his illness and through no fault of his own, simply never
received—or even knew of—the Department's Complaint. Moreover, because Mr. Black
did not know of the Complaint, his conduct could not rise to the level of neglect. Mr.
Black could not neglect the Complaint against him because he did not even know about
it. See Klapprott 335 U.S. 601 (defendant's conduct did not rise to the level of neglect
where his imprisonment and inability thereby to defend himself in court was tantamount
to lack of notice of the charges against him). Further, even though the Department seems
to recognize Mr. Black's enormous investment of time and money in his insurance license
and the significance of that license on his ability to make a living, the Department never
attempted to contact Mr. Black personally to notify him of its intention to default him.
Nor did the Department attempt to notify Mr. Diumenti of such intention, even though
they mailed him a copy of the Complaint.5
Finally, additional evidence has surfaced since Mr. Black filed his Motion to
indicate that in addition to his debilitating illness, his estranged wife was drugging him to
prevent him from any meaningful participation in the affairs of Black's Title. Thus, the
Department's argument that Mr. Black should have been aware of what was transpiring
"at the office" is weakened by these additional facts. While Mr. Black is aware of the

5

As set forth in Mr. Black's principal brief, while the Utah appellate courts have not
directly addressed the issue, other jurisdictions give substantial weight to whether the plaintiff has
given notice to defendant's counsel prior to obtaining default. In a collegial bar such as Utah's,
common courtesy would dictate such notification, so the parties could protect their rights,
particularly where counsel is involved.
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challenge of presenting that information for the first time before this Court, this is the
first "judicial" review of the Department's denial of the Motion, and that issue is simply
another factor urging the setting side of the Default Judgment on an equitable basis.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Department's denial of Mr.
Black's Motion and allow him the opportunity to have his case heard on its merits.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as the facts and arguments set forth in his principal
brief, Mr. Black respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Department's denial of
his Motion and by so doing, set aside the Default and Default Judgment entered against
him.
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